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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider three cases.  In the first, a distracted customer leaves his 
credit card behind in a restaurant, where an opportunistic fraud artist 
finds it.  In the second, an employer begins closely monitoring an 
employee’s home and family life without her knowledge or consent, and 
with only the most spurious justification.  In the third, as a person walks 
down her city street, she passes by dozens of people who notice her 
presence.  In each case, the person’s privacy decreases.  In the first two 
cases, it seems clear that the loss to privacy impinges a claim.1  It is 
equally clear that in the third case the loss impinges no claim at all.  
Moreover, the sort of claim implicated in the first two cases appears 
markedly different.  The claim to privacy in one’s credit card number 
primarily protects individuals from financial harm—it is a claim based 
on instrumental value.  The claim to privacy in one’s home and family 
life with respect to one’s employer, however, is not clearly based on 
instrumental value, especially where the surveillance is surreptitious and 
unlikely to lead to adverse actions.  The value of privacy in each of the 
three cases is different: instrumentally good, noninstrumentally good, 
and morally neutral. 
This creates a puzzle with respect to claims to privacy.  If privacy has 
very different value in different contexts, it will be difficult to determine 
where persons have claims to privacy.  That is, if privacy does not have 
a unified value, it will not make sense to simply argue that a person has a 
claim to privacy solely in virtue of the fact that her privacy has been 
diminished.  Compare this with other classic liberties: the diminution of 
one’s freedom of conscience or freedom of speech is not morally neutral 
and is problematic independent of the instrumental value of that liberty.  
That justifies the view that people have claims to freedom of conscience 
and freedom of speech, and that diminution of those liberties demands at 
least some justification.  This is not so with privacy. 
My contention is that privacy’s value is not unary, but distributed, and 
that whether privacy has value, and what kind of value it has, will depend 
on the privacy relation involved.  However, I think that particular sorts 
of privacy relations do have value, and that such relations may be 
constituent parts of intrinsically valuable states of affairs.  Accordingly, I 
 1. By claim, I just mean something short of an all-things-considered judgment of 
one’s moral due.  In that sense, one’s having a claim is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for one to have a right, where a right is a valid claim of one’s moral due.  This 
follows Joel Feinberg’s view in The Nature and Value of Rights.  See JOEL FEINBERG, 
The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143, 
143–58 (2d ed. 1997). 
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think that we can articulate some general principles regarding the conditions 
under which the value of privacy underwrites claims to privacy. 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Part II, I briefly explain my 
view of what privacy is—the particularized judgment account.  I then 
turn to the question of privacy’s value in Part III, where I examine 
several views prominent in the literature.  In Part IV, I outline my view 
of privacy’s value.  I argue that, at its strongest, privacy has constitutive 
value, which is to say that privacy is a constituent part of intrinsically 
valuable states of affairs.  However, in many cases, privacy’s value is 
not morally weighty.  Unlike other goods to which privacy is compared, 
I argue that we must examine the particular features of privacy in each 
context to determine whether it has value.  This makes it difficult to 
establish whether persons have claims to privacy.  Nonetheless, in Part 
V, I provide some principles that guide claims to privacy based on its 
constitutive value. 
II.  WHAT IS PRIVACY? 
Although the central questions in this paper concern the value of 
privacy, it is crucial to be clear just what privacy means.  In another 
paper, I develop what I call the particularized judgment account of 
privacy.2  I describe it in brief here. 
To begin, privacy necessarily involves a three-part relation between a 
person (or group of people), an object, and another person (or group 
of people): Person (P) has privacy about object (O) with respect to 
another person (Q); POQ will denote such a relation.  Thus, to simply say “P 
has privacy” will always be incomplete.  We can fill in the meaning of 
“P has privacy” by (1) pointing out a piece of information (for example, 
P’s thoughts), a view (for example, of P indisposed), or an action 
(for example, P’s decision to use birth control); and (2) by pointing 
out others who stand in some relation to P and O, for example, 
everyone, everyone but one’s confidants, or the state.  Thus, to say 
that one’s medical care is private is to say, of a person (P) who 
receives medical treatment (O), some other person or persons (Q) 
 2. The full account of this view can be found in Alan Rubel, The Particularized 
Judgment Account of Privacy (Apr. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per _id=353895. 




either do not know of that treatment, do not interfere with that 
treatment, or may not interfere with that treatment.3 
One area of contention in the privacy literature is what can properly be 
an object of privacy.4  While there is no dispute that privacy may concern 
information, and there is little question that privacy may concern 
observations, there is a deep divide as to whether one may have privacy 
with respect to decisions in the following sense: P has privacy about her 
decision to have an abortion (O) with respect to the state (Q) insofar as 
the state may not prevent P from having an abortion.  The three-part 
relation I describe may accommodate decisions as objects of privacy, but 
it need not.  The focus of this paper, however, is on informational privacy, 
and to a lesser extent, observational privacy.5  Thus, whether one may 
have privacy with respect to decisions does not bear on my analysis 
here. 
The particularized judgment account of privacy draws on the view that 
privacy is such a three-part relation.  It is based on the following two 
claims: 
Claim 1: P’s having informational privacy about O with respect to 
Q means that Q’s ability to make a particularized 
judgment about P regarding O is limited. 
Claim 2: P’s having observational privacy about O with respect to 
Q means that Q’s ability to observe O is limited. 
It is fairly clear who may count as a P or a Q in a particular POQ 
relationship.  P must be a person or persons, and Q must be a person, 
group of persons, or an entity that stands in relation to P as another person 
could—for instance, an organization, a company, or the state.  What can 
constitute O, however, is less clear.  What sort of information can be an 
 3. Id. at 2.  Note that this is a descriptive sense of privacy.  There is also a 
normative sense of privacy.  For example, we often say that something (O) is private, for 
example, one’s naked body, voting decisions, or financial information, in the sense that a 
person ought to be able to prevent others from learning, seeing, or controlling O, or that 
Q ought not pay excessive attention to O, or that P ought to keep O out of Q’s view.  
Thus, POQ might express a proposition about the way P or Q ought to act, regardless of 
the way P or Q actually acts.  For the purposes of this paper, privacy and its cognate 
terms are used in the descriptive sense.  Id. at 2–3. 
 4. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE 
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 26–27 (1997); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 
YALE L.J. 421 (1980), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 346, 356–58 
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. 1984); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 271–74 (1983). 
 5. This sort of privacy is sometimes called physical privacy.  Anita L. Allen, 
Constitutional Law and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 139, 148–49 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999); William A. Edmundson, Privacy, in 
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 271, 272–73 
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
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object of P’s privacy?  On the particularized judgment view, the only 
requirement is that the information pertain to P.  Where O is merely a 
fact about the world, such as a distant historical fact, then P may not 
have privacy about O with respect to Q.6 
The feature of the particularized judgment account of privacy that is 
crucial for this paper is that it takes an expansive view of what counts as 
a decrease in privacy.  Anything that allows Q to make a more particularized 
judgment about PO decreases P’s privacy about O with respect to Q.  
Thus, where Q learns a trivial piece of information about P, such as that 
P is walking down the sidewalk, P’s privacy about his whereabouts (O) 
decreases with respect to Q, though of course it does not decrease much.7 
III.  PRIVACY’S VALUE 
Presumably claims to privacy will have to be underwritten by privacy’s 
value.  To address the question of privacy’s value, it will be useful to 
demarcate a couple of ways in which something can be valuable.8  First, 
something is instrumentally valuable when its value comes from making 
some other good thing more likely to happen, or if it helps cause some 
other good thing to happen.  Instrumental value depends on consequences.  
In contrast, where something is valuable, independent of its consequences 
(or its likely consequences), it is intrinsically valuable.9  Intrinsic value 
may be further divided.  First, there are things that are valuable in themselves, 
whose value is independent of whatever else exists.10  Hedonists would 
place pleasure in this category, and Kantians would place the rational 
will in this category.  But there are a number of goods that one might 
consider valuable in themselves: the good life, health, virtue, aesthetic 
experience, or intimate relationships.  Things that are valuable in themselves 
may be complex, such that parts of those things are also valuable.  Those 
parts are constitutively valuable.  Thus, X is constitutively valuable when 
X is part of the reason why some intrinsically valuable thing, or some 
valuable state of affairs, Y, is valuable.  And Y is valuable—at least in 
part—in virtue of having X.  Joseph Raz explains this distinction by using 
art as an example.  One might posit that a life in which one experiences 
 6. See Rubel, supra note 2, at 16. 
 7. Id. at 24. 
 8. Here I follow closely Joseph Raz’s account in JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM 200–01 (photo. reprint 1990) (1986). 
 9. Id. at 200. 
 10. Id. 




art is valuable in itself, in which case, art would be constitutively 
valuable.  Notice that in this case, art is not just likely to result in something 
intrinsically valuable; rather, art is part of the intrinsically valuable thing 
itself.11  This description contrasts with a standard hedonistic utilitarian 
account, where only pleasure is intrinsically valuable.  On the hedonistic 
account, a life in which one experiences art is good insofar as it generates 
pleasure, and art itself is instrumentally valuable—and only instrumentally 
valuable—because its existence causes pleasure, or makes pleasure more 
likely.12 
There is little reason to think that privacy is valuable in itself in the 
way a hedonist considers pleasure valuable in itself.  However, there are 
a number of possibilities for privacy’s instrumental and constitutive 
value. 
A.  Privacy as Instrumentally Valuable 
A number of accounts attribute broad value to privacy and justify 
generalized claims to privacy based on its instrumental effects.  One 
such view is that privacy is instrumentally valuable insofar as it cultivates 
important relationships.  Different sorts of relationships involve varying 
degrees of intimacy and revelation of different types of personal information.  
Charles Fried argues that publicizing intimate information decreases the 
moral capital necessary to share intimate information within relationships.13  
The idea, I take it, is that sharing personal information requires an emotional 
investment and risk.  If the information is already out there—if Q already 
knows personal information (O) about P—then P takes no risk in relating 
the information.  Publicity therefore causes some harm to relationships 
that depend on members taking emotional risks.14  Similarly, losing control 
over information makes it more difficult to form those relationships that 
require a certain distance.  It is harder, for example, to have merely cordial 
professional relationships when one’s most personal information is 
 11. Id. at 201. 
 12. Id.  The distinction is even clearer, and the reason constitutive value differs 
from instrumental value is clearer, in cases where a constitutive good is instrumentally 
bad.  For example, the existence of art may be a constituent of the life with art, which is 
good in itself.  But at the same time art might distract one from certain relationships that 
are good in themselves, causing them to founder, or making them less likely to flourish.  
This would suffice to make art instrumentally bad, independent of its being constitutively 
good.  Of course, the same thing might be both instrumentally good and instrumentally 
bad as well, if it makes some good outcomes more likely and also makes other bad 
outcomes more likely.  This example simply aims to make the contrast between constitutive 
value and instrumental value clearer. 
 13. Charles Fried, Privacy [A Moral Analysis], 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475–93 (1968), 
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 203, 211–212. 
 14. Id. at 207–12. 
RUBEL ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC 2/7/2008  3:10:18 PM 
[VOL. 44:  921, 2007]  Claims to Privacy 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 927 
 
widely known.  This leads James Rachels to argue that privacy is important 
“to maintain the variety of social relationships with other people that we 
want to have.”15 
This view captures important features of privacy.  One thing that 
distinguishes close relationships is the degree to which people in them 
share information, and it would be hard to consider someone who never 
shared much to be a close friend.  Similarly, being unable to withhold 
information might make arm’s-length business relationships and casual 
friendships difficult or burdensome.  However, this view is an unsatisfying 
account of privacy’s value and provides a weak foundation for privacy 
claims because, while privacy is instrumentally valuable in having many 
and varied good relationships (genuinely intimate relationships, arm’s-
length business relationships, et cetera), it is also useful in having many 
and varied bad relationships.  Just as the fact that P’s privacy about 
information allows him to decide whether and to what extent P will 
reveal that information to others, it allows P to decide who he will pretend 
to reveal himself to.  Similarly, while such control of information allows 
one to conduct business at arm’s length by keeping personal matters 
outside the purview of transactions, it may also allow withholding 
information that other parties consider important to their businesses.16 
A related view considers the instrumental value of privacy for people 
other than the one who has privacy.17  Easy interaction is important for a 
variety of social goods.  If P’s views about the fecklessness of her supervisors 
or the incompetence of her coworkers becomes widely known, it would 
be exceedingly difficult for work to go smoothly.  Similarly, where 
people learn salacious facts about others, it becomes harder for them to 
focus on much else, thus stifling normal interactions.  This view also provides 
a poor foundation for arguing that privacy is itself strongly instrumentally 
valuable.  First, it largely depends on our facility in ignoring certain 
information.  That some information makes normal social interaction 
difficult may be a reason to change our mores and mindsets rather than a 
 15. James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS 323 (1975), 
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 290, 292. 
 16. Richard Posner argues that personal privacy imposes substantial costs where 
people withhold potentially discrediting information.  Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Theory of Privacy, REGULATION, May–June 1978, at 19, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 333, 337–38. 
 17. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 
3, 3–13 (1998). 




prescription for reticence and privacy.18  Moreover, this view is less an 
account of the instrumental value of privacy than it is an account of the 
instrumental value of inoffensiveness or politeness.  There are a host of 
topics that can cripple normal interactions, but only some of them bear 
on privacy.  It is hard to see, for example, how telling scatological or racist 
jokes is contrary to privacy, but the social effect of doing so is often 
similar to discussing personal matters: it is simply hard to get past.19  
The relevant fact about such a case is not privacy, then; it is shock value, 
perhaps, or offensiveness. 
Another possibility is that privacy is valuable for the effective function of 
democratic processes.  One such view is that privacy facilitates people’s 
entry into positions of responsibility.  Thus, if potential officeholders 
think that the likelihood and magnitude of disclosing embarrassing 
claims is great enough to outweigh whatever benefits public office 
confers, the pool of people from which officials are drawn will become 
smaller.20  And if the pool of people from which we draw elected and 
appointed officials shrinks, the argument runs, then opportunities for 
good governance decrease because some well-qualified candidates will 
be among those culled.21 
Such a view might be right, so far as it goes: protecting privacy 
generally may protect the pool of candidates for public office, which 
ultimately results in better officers.  To the extent that it is speculative, 
though, it is a very weak justification for claims to provide.  More 
importantly, such a view overestimates the importance of having the best 
qualified people hold public office.  Certainly this is desirable, but it is 
 18. It is worth pointing out just how significant this can be.  People may not wish 
to know of—or be able to get past in the way Nagel describes—things that are deeply 
important, and that would be better off in the open than concealed.  Sexual orientation is 
like this.  Some people do not wish to know whether others are gay, and knowing that 
others are gay makes social interaction difficult for them.  A convention favoring 
reticence, though, has the consequence of making homosexuality less noticeable and 
easier to marginalize, which in turn reinforces the convention.  Thanks to Claudia Card 
for pointing out this example. 
 19. Of course doing so reveals information about the joke teller, and responses 
reveal something about the audience, and to this extent they bear upon privacy.  That is, 
P’s privacy with respect to disposition and sense of humor (O) decreases with respect to 
the audience (Q) when P tells an off-color joke.  But this does not fully account for the 
impact of such a joke on social interaction.  We may take it on good authority that P is 
crude and racist, and enjoys telling crude, racist jokes, but knowledge of that fact 
does less to social interaction than hearing him tell such a joke.  Thus, the privacy/ 
informational issue is ancillary. 
 20. Nagel argues, for example, that the enormous attention paid to Clarence 
Thomas and Anita Hill and to Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky had such an effect on 
people’s beliefs about the possibility of disclosure, even if such scandals do not evince a 
greater likelihood of disclosures.  Nagel, supra note 17, at 26–27. 
 21. Gavison, supra note 4, at 370. 
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only one of many justifications for democratic processes.  Democratic 
governance is justified by consent of the governed, and because such 
consent requires information, privacy will take a subordinate role.  It is 
no doubt unfortunate when people shy from service or when citizens 
focus on trivial matters.  Avoiding that misfortune does count in privacy’s 
favor.  However, such considerations will pale next to citizen autonomy 
in political choices when it comes to making all-things-considered 
judgments about the value of privacy. 
Another possibility is that privacy facilitates processes important for 
democracy.  So, for example, privacy may facilitate democratic processes 
by fostering political associations.  Interest groups, political parties, labor 
unions, and nongovernmental organizations play an important role in 
modern democracies, and the internal deliberations of such groups often 
provide the foundations for arguments made in public forums.  That such 
deliberations are done internally and privately may allow good, but 
inchoate, ideas a chance to develop without attention from the broader 
public, which might stunt such development.22  Certainly political associations 
themselves will often benefit from privacy.  But it by no means follows that 
what benefits such associations also benefits democratic processes overall.  
Consider, for example, the contemporary U.S. practice of such associations 
writing, or helping to write, large swaths of legislation, which often passes 
with little opportunity for public deliberation.  If the legislation is bad, 
then the inability for the public—including other associations—to examine 
it with sufficient time for public deliberation is instrumentally bad. 
Instrumental accounts of the value of privacy are compelling in the 
sense that if the goods posited by an instrumental account (for example, 
certain types of relationships or better democratic structures) are in fact 
more likely to come about with greater privacy, then privacy is in fact 
valuable.  But this is precisely their weakness as well.  If privacy’s value 
is merely instrumental, it is unlikely to provide a foundation for the 
broad privacy claims or the stringent privacy protections that many 
people think are warranted. 
 22. As Gavison writes, “Privacy is crucial to democracy in providing the 
opportunity for parties to work out their political positions, and to compromise with 
opposing factions, before subjecting their positions to public scrutiny.” Id.; see also 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 US 449, 460 (1958) (holding that First 
Amendment freedom of association includes privacy of political association in order to 
guarantee effective expression of political views).  See generally ALLEN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY 
AND FREEDOM 23–51 (1967) (analyzing the relation between privacy and democracy). 




A second limitation of instrumental views of privacy’s value is that 
they will tend to underdetermine the scope of valuable privacy.  For 
example, the view that privacy is valuable for maintaining many and 
varied relationships gives us some reason to think that people having 
privacy about information in their day-to-day lives with respect to the 
general public is a good thing.  However, it does not give us a reason to 
think that having privacy about medical information with respect to 
employers or insurers is a good thing.  And the view that privacy facilitates 
democratic governance by incubating the inchoate policy views of political 
organizations may give us a reason to limit the availability of information 
about and observation of those organizations’ internal deliberations, but 
it tells us nothing about whether individuals’ privacy—other than facts 
about their participation in such organizations—is valuable. 
A more significant problem for instrumental views has to do with the 
relative merits of privacy protection.  That privacy is instrumentally valuable 
means that privacy makes some other good more likely to occur.  This is 
a comparative judgment: Privacy makes a good more likely to occur 
than if privacy were absent.  However, there may be other possibilities.  
Things other than privacy might facilitate that further good just as well 
as privacy does.  In such cases there will be no reason to favor protecting 
privacy—and no reason to posit claims to privacy—rather than an 
alternative instrument.23 
B.  Privacy as Constitutively Valuable 
One appeal of the instrumental accounts is their conceptual plausibility; 
they are easy to make sense of.  This is especially so because the view 
that privacy is noninstrumentally valuable is initially implausible.  
Privacy does not seem to resemble archetypical intrinsic goods, such as 
pleasure, intimate relationships, aesthetic experience, and virtue.  It would 
be a mistake, though, to conclude that if privacy is valuable at all, it 
must be so only instrumentally.  Another possibility is that privacy is 
closely and noninstrumentally tied to other goods that are themselves 
intrinsically valuable.  That is, privacy may be constitutively valuable.  
 23. Adam Kolber raises the question of whether my approach of considering and 
discarding a series of potential instrumental benefits misses the possibility that privacy is 
overall instrumentally beneficial based on its combined value across many domains.  
This is an important point.  I think it is correct that privacy will have various instrumental 
benefits across domains.  However, as the discussion above suggests, I am uncertain of 
privacy’s value in each context.  I am therefore uncertain of privacy’s cumulative value 
as well.  In addition, note that I acknowledge that instrumental value will remain as a 
ground for privacy claims where privacy is of positive instrumental value.  However, my 
task here is establishing claims to privacy that are not based on indeterminate 
instrumental value. 
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There are three accounts that are plausible constitutive value views: 
(1) privacy is a constituent of personality; (2) privacy protects meaning-
conferring goods; and (3) failure to preserve privacy may be a failure to 
respect persons.  Consider them in turn. 
There is a cluster of views that take privacy to be fundamentally 
related to personhood,24 personality,25 or personal dignity.26  Certainly 
personality, identity, and dignity are plausible candidates for intrinsic 
value; they are the sorts of things that one typically values in a way that 
goes beyond the utility they afford.  Where one has little privacy, which 
is to say where others have unfettered access to information about a 
person and where that person is usually under observation, the opportunity 
to uniquely develop one’s personality diminishes.27  The extent to which 
one is responsible, in her own right, for who she is is diminished where 
there is no privacy—consider institutional settings such as prisons, the 
military, or boarding schools.28 
A related and more promising view concerns the impact of privacy 
loss on the way persons view themselves and their relationships.  Here I 
wish to draw on Ferdinand Schoeman’s view of state intervention into 
family matters.29  Schoeman argues that the reason parents ought to be 
 24. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 26, 37–40 (1976), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra 
note 4, at 300, 310.  Anita Allen refers to this cluster of views as personhood accounts.  
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 43 (1988). 
 25. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
205 (1890), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 75, 
82. 
 26. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962 (1964), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 
156, 187–88. 
 27. Reiman calls it conferring “[moral] title to one’s existence.”  Reiman, supra 
note 24, at 310.  The idea, I take it, is that when one is responsible for one’s personality 
or, as Reiman puts it, “self” (for example, when one’s personality is mostly of one’s own 
making), one can actually take credit or blame (“moral title”) for it.  Insofar as privacy 
makes one responsible for one’s personality or self, then, privacy allows one to take 
credit or blame for it. 
 28. This is not to say that one’s decisions to enter such institutions, when 
voluntary, are not aspects of one’s personality, and it is not to say that there are neither 
important instrumental reasons for such settings or some different measure of intrinsic 
value to shared or institutional identity.  The claim is merely that some object of intrinsic 
value necessarily decreases with a thorough dismantling of privacy, viz., a personality 
that is to a greater degree one’s own making. 
 29. Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral 
Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6 (1980).  Thanks to Harry Brighouse for pointing out 
this view. 




able to raise their children without state involvement (except in abusive 
situations) stems from the nature of intimate relationships, which are a 
source of much of life’s meaning.30  State intervention in family affairs 
changes people’s view of family relationships from intimate, meaning-
conferring goods to social goods, thus depriving people of a source of 
meaning.  Schoeman’s idea seems to be that self-monitoring, or viewing 
one’s self and family as the kind of thing that is subject to intervention 
on social policy grounds, changes the nature of one’s family relationships.  
Implicit in this view is that relationships’ meaning stems in part from 
how people view those relationships. 
Schoeman’s idea is compatible with the view that privacy per se is a 
constituent part of the intrinsic value of intimate relationships.  It adds 
the claim that not viewing a relationship as public is important as well, 
for its meaning as primarily an intimate relationship rather than a social 
good turns in part upon people not viewing it as a social good.  This 
view runs into the problem of not explicitly distinguishing between privacy 
and the belief in privacy.  As long as people in intimate relationships believe 
they are private, and therefore do not view the relationships as mere 
social goods, their meaning-conferring role is unharmed.  This tension, 
though, points to another value in which privacy plays a role.  It is important 
that our beliefs in privacy be well justified.  Where we believe that we 
have privacy, but do not in fact have privacy, there is a harm.  It is 
intrinsically valuable for our expectations to match reality, at least with 
respect to things we consider meaningful.31 
Another way in which privacy may be intrinsically valuable is its 
relation to other things of intrinsic value.  That is, it may be that impinging 
privacy necessarily undermines some other thing that is intrinsically 
valuable.  On this view, a state of affairs is not valuable in virtue of P’s 
having privacy.  Rather, it is valuable in virtue of some other facts, but 
P’s loss of privacy will entail that the intrinsic value of that state of affairs 
decreases.  This view is not that privacy makes such states of affairs 
more likely—in other words, that privacy is instrumentally valuable in 
facilitating such states of affairs.  Rather, it is that failure to respect privacy 
entails a failure to respect persons. 
The clearest example of this approach is the view that privacy is 
valuable as the object of autonomous choice.  There are two primary ways 
that this might be the case.  First, there is the fact that people often prefer, 
and autonomously choose to retain, privacy about many things.  When 
people so prefer, and especially when people so choose, loss of privacy 
 30. Id. at 14–15. 
 31. I develop this view more fully in Alan Rubel, Privacy and the USA PATRIOT 
Act: Rights, the Value of Rights, and Autonomy, 26 LAW & PHIL. 119, 153–54 (2007). 
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contravenes their autonomous choices.  This is a weak foundation for the 
value of privacy.  There can be any number of things that people 
autonomously choose that have no independent moral weight, and they 
are valuable only to the extent that people happen to value them—for 
example, consumer goods.  Without some further reason to think that 
privacy is a more important object of such choice, it would be wrong to 
attribute special value to it just because people prefer and value it. 
The more interesting possibility focuses on the importance of respect 
for persons as choosers who are able to develop their own sense of what 
is of value, and shape their lives according to that sense of value.  That 
capacity, the argument runs, creates a reason to respect such choices, at 
least within certain domains.  Thus, in Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for 
Persons, Stanley Benn argues that respecting others as persons demands, 
first, that one be conscious of himself as “capable of having projects, and 
assessing his achievements in relation to” those projects, and second, 
that one conceive of each other person as “actually or potentially a 
chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course through the world . . . 
and correcting [his] course as he perceives his errors.”32  Understanding 
the other person in this way demands that we see what happens to that 
other person as important and valuable according to the terms she has 
chosen to guide her life by, in the same way that one measures the 
importance and value of one’s own life according to the terms one has 
set for oneself.  In other words, we measure our own lives according to 
the projects we have chosen and terms we have set, and respecting others’ 
demands that we recognize others’ choices of projects and benchmarks.  
This respect, Benn argues, demands that we pay others a degree of 
consideration in their attitudes, choices, and projects.33  The mere fact 
that others value something, of course, does not suffice to give one a reason 
to weigh that value.  After all, P’s desire for free beer does not give Q 
much reason to provide it.  Rather, others’ valuations are relevant when 
they “make a difference to the conditions under which [the other person] 
makes his choices, either denying him an otherwise available option . . . 
or changing the significance or meaning for [that person] of acts still 
open to him.”34  P’s valuing privacy is relevant in this way, for where P 
 32. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: 
PRIVACY 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 223, 228–29. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 229. 




lacks privacy, it is likely to impact the way P pursues whatever it is that 
she values.  And Q’s infringement of P’s privacy is a failure of respect 
for that valuation. 
The constitutive value accounts are in many ways more satisfactory 
than instrumental accounts.  Unlike the instrumental accounts, they do 
not depend on a causal story about the relation of privacy to some further 
value, and if privacy is constitutively valuable, other goods will not 
provide a substitute for privacy protections.  However, the constitutive 
views still have important weaknesses.  One is that the constitutive views do 
not fully cover the scope of valuable privacy.  That is, certain aspects of 
privacy are clearly only instrumentally valuable (for instance, privacy in 
one’s credit card numbers).  Thus, privacy per se cannot be constitutively 
valuable.  Rather, what is valuable are the goods furthered by privacy, or 
the goods of which privacy is a constituent part. 
Another important concern with the constitutive value approach is that 
if privacy is valuable because impinging it in certain circumstances 
entails a failure to respect persons, it suggests that privacy is of 
derivative, rather than primary, value.35  By this I just mean that privacy 
may be valuable generally, but privacy’s value will be justified by its 
value in a variety of contexts, which together render privacy itself 
valuable.  However, the direction of justification will be from specific 
varied instances in which privacy is valuable to the general proposition 
that privacy is valuable, rather than the other way around.  Compare this 
with free speech.  We take free speech to be a matter of right in a variety 
of contexts: political discussion, commercial advertising, artistic expression, 
active participation in one’s communities.  If free speech is justified in 
each of the circumstances by a general right to free speech, each of those 
instances of free speech rights will be derivative of that general right.  
On the other hand, if the general proposition that people have free 
speech rights is justified by each of the particular instances in which 
people have such rights, those instances will be primary and the general 
proposition derivative.36  If the value of privacy—that is, the justification 
for any privacy claims—is that impinging on it in certain contexts entails 
disrespecting persons, it would seem that whatever general right to privacy 
 35. See, e.g., Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, 
61 J. PHIL. 628, 629–30 (1964); see also J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 
197–98 (1984). 
 36. Raz helpfully illustrates this contrast with the example of a person’s ownership 
of a block of real estate.  If the person buys the block one parcel at a time, his rights of 
ownership in the block are derivative of the rights of ownership in the individual parcels.  
But if the person inherits the whole block in one transaction, his rights of ownership in 
the block are the primary, or core, rights, and his rights of ownership in the individual 
parcels are derivative.  Raz, supra note 35, at 197–98. 
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we have will be justified by appealing to a number of those contexts.  It will 
follow that privacy has no unique, independent value.  This is not necessarily 
problematic; however, it is an important consequence to note. 
C.  Reductionism 
Because privacy has different value in different contexts, and because 
the constituent value views may render privacy of derivative value, it 
may be that we should take a reductionist approach to privacy’s value, 
by which I mean that whatever value privacy appears to have is really 
the value of other goods.  The most notable reductionist view of privacy 
comes from Judith Jarvis Thomson.37  Thomson takes as a starting point 
the claim that there is little agreement about what privacy rights are, and 
the particular privacy rights that are widely agreed upon are quite 
disparate.  She argues that privacy rights are in fact a cluster of other 
rights, including property rights, the right not to be looked at, and the 
right not to have certain pieces of one’s information gathered.38  Thus, 
whatever privacy rights we have are derivative of those other rights.  
Thomson is specifically concerned with rights to privacy, rather than the 
value of privacy, which is my focus here.  However, if we take the view 
to be that different values underlie our various rights, and that only in 
combination do those various rights constitute a right to privacy, it 
seems plausible, if not necessary, that the values underlying privacy are 
also varied. 
There are at least a couple of problems with this view.  The first is that 
even if we can describe privacy rights as a cluster of other rights, this is 
not sufficient to say that the right to privacy is derivative of those rights 
rather than those rights being derivative of privacy rights.39  Whether a 
right is derivative of other rights is a matter of its justification; that is, a 
right is derivative of other rights if, and because, those other rights 
provide the justification for the first right.  The same is true of values.  
Whether the value of privacy derives from the goods of having one’s 
property respected or not having one’s information gathered does not 
follow from the fact that we can dissect privacy’s value into distinct 
 37. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 295, 
310–11 (1975), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 
272, 284–85. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See ALLEN, supra note 24, at 41; Rachels, supra note 15, at 297–98; Reiman, 
supra note 24, at 300–02. 




parts.  It is at least as plausible that those parts are valuable just because 
privacy is valuable.  The second problem is that, even if privacy’s value 
is derivative from other goods, there may be something common to the 
goods that together comprise privacy’s value.40 
So, there are some reasons to think that the value of privacy is derivative 
of other values, and that the value of privacy at base relies on other 
values.  The question becomes whether that suffices to show that a reductionist 
account is correct.  I think that it does not.  Contrast with other liberties, 
claims to which may be underwritten by several values.  For example, 
individuals’ freedom of conscience may be instrumentally valuable in 
maintaining a stable, pluralistic society, and it may be the case that 
impinging freedom of conscience entails disrespecting persons’ autonomy.  
That is, there are a cluster of values that underwrite freedom of conscience.  
However, it need not follow that the value of freedom of conscience is 
reducible to those other values, or that the value of freedom of conscience is 
derivative of those other values.  Rather, it only follows that the value of 
freedom of conscience includes those other values, perhaps in addition 
to whatever unique intrinsic (or constitutive) value it has. 
IV.  THE DISTRIBUTED VALUE VIEW 
In the preceding part I considered a number of accounts of privacy’s 
value.  I argued that while instrumental views do account for some cases 
in which privacy seems valuable, they are a weak foundation for 
generalized privacy claims.  I also considered three types of constituent 
value accounts, and argued that they were plausible, but incomplete.  
Finally, I argued that there is some merit in a reductionist account of 
privacy’s value, but that such an account is ultimately unsatisfying.  We 
are pulled in opposing directions.  On the one hand, we have powerful, 
broadly held, and resilient intuitions that privacy matters and that people 
have some claim to privacy at least in some contexts.  On the other hand, 
attempts to provide a justification for such claims are unsatisfying. 
The way to proceed, it seems, is to revisit the particularized judgment 
account of privacy.  If that view is correct and speaking of privacy without 
specifying a particular POQ relation is necessarily incomplete, then it 
should not be surprising that the different conceptions of privacy’s value 
are unsatisfying.  After all, those conceptions fail to specify particular 
POQ relationships.  Indeed, it would be surprising if a unified view could 
provide a cogent case for the value of all, or even most, such relationships.  
This becomes even clearer if we take into account my expansive view of 
 40. Reiman calls the first criticism the “little non sequitur” and the second the 
“large non sequitur.”  Reiman, supra note 24, at 301. 
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what counts as a decrease in privacy.  The particularized judgment view 
entails that privacy loss happens persistently and in mundane ways.  An 
example I used above concerned P walking down the sidewalk where Q 
could see.  On my view, this decreases P’s privacy about her whereabouts 
(O) with respect to Q.  Such decreases in privacy happen frequently.  
Attributing value to privacy simpliciter, however, would commit us to 
either regretting the decrease or explaining why that decrease is an 
exception and therefore not of consequence. 
As an alternative, I offer the distributed value view.  On my view, the 
value of privacy will depend on the privacy relationships involved.  That 
is, POQ may be valuable for one reason, POQ' may be valuable for a 
different reason, and POQ'' may have no value at all.  Thus, we cannot 
attribute any value, or any type of value, to privacy per se.  This, I believe, 
motivates the reductionist impulse.  Indeed, the distributed value view is 
reductionist in the following sense: whatever value privacy simpliciter 
has is just a function of the value of various subsets of privacy relations—
for example, POQs.  However, on the distributed value account, in contrast 
to the reductionist view, types of privacy relations—that is, privacy 
properly construed—will have value that is not similarly reducible. 
A.  Constitutive Value 
In Part III, I set out the basics of a constitutive value approach to 
privacy’s value.  My task in this part is to expand on those ideas in order 
to better understand privacy as a constitutive value.  Recall that there are 
two aspects of a thing having constitutive value: (1) it is part of some 
other good that is valuable in itself; and (2) the other good will be 
valuable in itself in virtue (in part) of the thing that is of constitutive 
value.  To help illustrate why privacy may be of constitutive value, I 
begin by considering a few cases that illustrate the point, where a state of 
affairs is valuable in virtue of its being private. 
The clearest examples concern privacy in intimate relationships.  
Suppose, for example, that two people are discussing something deeply 
important to them as an intimate pair—what is important to them in and 
about the relationship, perhaps.  Unbeknownst to the couple, a police 
surveillance team, having trained its listening device on the apartment 
across the hall where legitimate criminal suspects reside, but picking up 




more signal than they expect, is listening to every word.41  Because the 
couple believes they have privacy—with good reason, given the 
constraints upon surveillance and the fact that they are not suspicious 
people—their loss of privacy is not instrumentally bad for their relationship.  
Moreover, the police in this case do not obviously violate a right or fail 
to respect the couple; the eavesdropping was accidental and came from 
good intentions.  And yet it still seems as though something of value is 
diminished.  I submit it is that the couple’s conversation is no longer 
private, and its being private is a constituent part of the value of that 
conversation.  One might argue that what is intrinsically bad in this case 
is the fact that the couple’s belief in their privacy does not match reality.  
However, the fact that we all have mistaken beliefs of one sort or 
another makes this less important to the case.  After all, the couple might 
also mistakenly believe that it is still daylight out as they converse, but 
this does not seem at all bad.  The reason that the mistaken belief in 
privacy is important is that privacy is a constituent part of the value of 
their conversation; light conditions outside are not. 
Why, though, should we think that privacy is important here?  That is, 
what supports the assertion that privacy is a constituent element of the 
intrinsic value of the relationship and the conversation?  There are two 
possibilities in the surveillance case; either the subjects are aware of the 
monitoring, or they are not.  If they are aware of the monitoring, it will 
inevitably change the nature of their interactions.  If, on the other hand, 
they are unaware of the monitoring, then they are acting under an important 
misconception.  In either case, the value of the interaction itself diminishes, 
which is to say that privacy is a constituent part of the interaction, and it 
is a constituent in virtue of which the interaction has value. 
Next, consider friends sharing a secret.  The secret is not about 
something that would be harmful if revealed, and the friends do not 
really worry about the secret being exposed.  However, the fact that they 
have privacy with respect to that secret seems good, even absent an 
instrumental benefit to sharing it.  It is part of what defines the friendship, 
part of what constitutes the friendship, and therefore is intrinsically 
valuable.  Note that the belief that they share secrets is not what helps 
define the friendship; it is the fact, if it is a fact, that they do so. 
In addition to the intuitive cases, another reason to think that privacy 
is constitutively valuable concerns persons’ expectations of privacy.  
 41. One can of course quibble with the example: Do the police violate rights—and 
therefore fail to respect persons—by not better calibrating their device?  Do police have 
an obligation—legal or moral—to stop listening once they realize that the conversation is 
not relevant?  Neither should impact the example, for the example can be modified to 
account for such objections. 
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Recall from Part III Schoeman’s argument that state intervention in 
family matters is problematic because it treats families as a social good 
rather than a meaning-conferring good, which in turn leads people to 
view their own families as social goods rather than meaning-conferring 
goods, which has the effect of diminishing the extent to which families 
actually do confer meaning.42  Privacy may have a similar feature—where 
something being public makes it more spectacle and less meaning-conferring.  
This, though, will depend upon people’s beliefs about privacy rather than 
their actual privacy.  Even so, I think that there is still reason to think that 
privacy itself is valuable here.  It is valuable for things to confer meaning 
for the right reasons.  So, if one takes an event’s meaning to be in part 
constituted by it being private—for example, a shared secret or unobserved 
moments—but only because one is mistaken about it being private, that 
meaning is not well supported.  It seems intrinsically good that the 
meaning we derive from events be well supported, and in those cases 
where privacy is part of that meaning, actually having privacy, rather 
than a mere belief of privacy, is a constituent part of that good. 
B.  Privacy’s Oddness 
The important features of the distributed value view thus far are, first, 
that it relates the descriptive view of privacy as a three-part relation with 
the question of value, and second, it accommodates the disparity in the 
values that seem to underwrite privacy claims.  There is another important 
feature that I alluded to in the introduction, namely, that it is markedly 
different from other, classic liberties.  As I set out the distributed value 
view, privacy will have value only in some cases, and will therefore only 
underwrite claims to privacy in some cases.  This, though, contrasts with 
other types of goods to which people have claims.  Compare claims to 
autonomy, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, and freedom from 
harm.  Each of these has some instrumental value, and there are many 
cases in which claims to each may be overridden.  However, none has 
morally neutral instances, and each is more consistently a constituent 
part of something else that is itself intrinsically valuable.  Thus, each of 
those goods serves to underwrite a claim fairly directly.  So long as we 
can recognize a state of affairs as a decrease in freedom of conscience, 
 42. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 




for example, a person losing that freedom has a claim.43  That is emphatically 
not true with respect to privacy.  Once we determine that P’s privacy 
about O with respect to Q has decreased, it is a further question whether 
P has even a prima facie claim that the privacy not decrease.  This 
feature makes it difficult to determine just when people have claims to 
privacy.  In the next part, I try to provide guidelines on that issue. 
V.  CIRCUMSCRIBING THE DISTRIBUTED VALUE VIEW:                                  
CLAIMS TO PRIVACY 
The distributed value view holds that privacy’s value is variable and 
will depend on the circumstances surrounding a privacy relationship.  
Depending on the circumstances, privacy may be morally neutral, of 
positive or negative instrumental value, or of constitutive value.  Presumably, 
though, the point of discussing privacy’s value in the first place is to 
determine whether and to what extent people have claims to privacy.  
But where privacy decreases are morally neutral, which is often true, one 
has no claim to that privacy.  To the extent that privacy has weak or 
negative instrumental value, or where its instrumental value is offset by 
the instrumental value of a lack of privacy, it will fail to underwrite 
claims to privacy. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, this creates a puzzle with respect 
to claims to privacy.  If privacy has very different value in different 
contexts, it will be difficult to determine where persons have claims to 
privacy.  That is, if privacy does not have a unified value, it will not make 
sense to simply argue that a person has a claim to privacy solely in virtue 
of the fact that her privacy has diminished.  The purpose of this part is to 
help specify the conditions under which P has a claim to privacy about 
O with respect to Q based upon the constitutive value of that particular 
POQ relationship. 
There are two points about this project that are important to make 
clear.  First, the need for specificity derives from my view of privacy 
and its value, as recounted in Part IV.  Second, instrumental value will 
always be a potential ground for privacy claims.  However, as I argued 
in Part III, the instrumental value of privacy is often indeterminate.  
Certainly there are some instrumental benefits to a broad range of 
privacy relationships, but whether those relationships are instrumentally 
valuable overall is unclear.  Relying on instrumental value, then, will be 
a weak foundation for privacy claims.  But the distributed value account 
is in part a constitutive value account, and may therefore draw on 
 43. Again, this is something short of an all-things-considered judgment of one’s 
moral due. 
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privacy’s constitutive value to underwrite claims.  Thus, in accord with the 
constitutive views outlined in Part III, we can say, as a general matter, 
where privacy has constitutive value, there will be claims to privacy. 
First, P will have a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q where 
O is a meaning-conferring good, where P’s ability to derive meaning 
from O depends on P’s not viewing O as a public good, and where P’s 
loss of privacy about O with respect to Q tends to make P view O as a 
public good.  The idea is that as it becomes possible for others to make 
more particularized inferences about a personal relationship, or about the 
way in which one pursues projects, or about the way in which a small 
group interacts, the degree to which those in the relationship, pursuing 
the project, or participating in the group see those things as public will 
increase, and the type of meaning that those people will draw from the 
relationship, project, or group will change. 
Second, P will have a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q 
where O plays an important role in P’s shaping her personality and 
actions, and where P’s loss of privacy about O with respect to Q would 
lead P to alter O.  One example that runs through the privacy literature 
concerns people’s choices regarding what they read, write for their own 
consumption, watch, and listen to.  P will have a stronger claim to privacy 
about O with respect to Q where Q’s learning about the things P reads, 
writes for her own consumption, and listens to leads, or is likely to lead, 
P to alter her habits. 
Third, people will have claims to privacy where privacy is important 
in respecting their choices and valuations.  This principle tracks the view 
that respecting persons demands taking seriously their choices and 
values in the projects and relationships that shape their lives.  People 
care about, guard, and expect privacy.  That concern may be a constitutive 
part of intrinsic value in the ways discussed above, and privacy itself 
may be part of people’s conceptions of a good life.  Moreover, because 
people place particular value on privacy in the domains they place at the 
center of their lives, respecting persons demands respecting privacy.  
Because of privacy’s constitutive role, and because of the breadth and 
depth of the sentiment in favor of privacy, that concern and expectation 
are not unreasonable.  Thus, P has a claim to privacy about O with respect 
to Q where O is an object that plays a central feature in shaping P’s life, 
and in which P has a reasonable concern for and a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to Q. 




But these are very general, and simply track the ways privacy may be 
constitutively valuable.  We can glean other principles guiding claims by 
examining some examples, which I have organized according to the 
persons involved in the privacy relation; that is, according to the Q in the 
POQ relation. 
A.  Privacy with Respect to Other Individuals 
As noted above, the particularized judgment view of privacy commits 
one to saying that Pete (P) walking down the sidewalk where Jeff (Q) 
can see diminishes Pete’s privacy about his whereabouts with respect to 
Jeff.  Generally, even if Jeff actively watches Pete, further decreasing 
Pete’s informational privacy as well as his observational privacy, it is 
hard to see that Pete has lost something of value.44 
Things are less clear in the case where Jeff finds Pete interesting, and 
starts to seek out information about him.  That is, rather than casually 
observing Pete’s walk, suppose that Jeff follows Pete around, keeping 
detailed notes about all of Pete’s actions: where he stops, who he talks 
to, what he talks to them about, and so forth.  Suppose further that 
Jeff photographs the walks, plots their course on a map, and compiles 
detailed data about the walks.  Jeff begins to record other aspects of Pete’s 
life: his work habits, his genealogy, and his friends and their habits.  He 
picks Pete’s paper coffee cup out of the garbage to get a saliva sample 
from which to analyze Pete’s DNA, retrieves a hair sample from Pete’s 
barber’s floor to run a quick drug test, and purchases a list of calls to and 
from Pete’s cell phone.  Jeff takes all of this information and analyzes it 
in painstaking detail, trying to discern everything he can about Pete. 
Jeff’s actions clearly decrease Pete’s privacy in many aspects of his 
life, and the situation is creepy, even if we stipulate that Jeff has no 
inclination or ability to physically harm, steal from, defraud, or defame 
Pete.45  The questions are whether Pete has lost something of value, and 
whether Jeff has impinged a claim.  One possibility is that it depends on 
Pete’s point of view.  If Pete discovers the extent to which Jeff has gathered 
and analyzed information, it is likely that Pete would be disconcerted, 
 44. There may be exceptions, though.  Perhaps Pete is in some way disfigured, 
such that Jeff’s attention is particularly intrusive, or perhaps Jeff is somehow menacing.  
Establishing such claims, however, would require arguments about why the particular 
case gives rise to a claim, as in the disfigurement case, and whether the claim is really 
about privacy at all, as in the menacing gaze case. 
 45. While stalking is criminal in all fifty states, persistent information gathering is 
generally not sufficient to constitute stalking under the relevant laws.  The statutes 
generally require a credible threat to the victim or victim’s family, and many require that 
the stalker have the intent to cause fear or that the victim actually fear injury or death.  
See Mark Irving, Domestic Violence, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 451, 455–62 (2002). 
RUBEL ARTICLE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC 2/7/2008  3:10:18 PM 
[VOL. 44:  921, 2007]  Claims to Privacy 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 943 
 
even if he does not feel threatened.  That kind of attention might lead 
Pete to monitor his activities to guard against embarrassing incidents and 
behavior patterns, or it might distract him from things he would rather be 
thinking about.  Now, any of the various accounts of privacy’s value can 
explain why this loss of privacy is at least prima facie problematic.  The 
instrumental accounts can point to its effect on Pete’s other valuable 
activities.  The constitutive value views can argue that, first, Jeff has 
failed to respect Pete as a person who values doing things unmonitored, 
and, second, that Pete has lost something of value with his self-monitoring. 
Neither of these views is satisfactory, though, for the instrumental 
view may get the calculation wrong—Pete’s loss may be minimal, and 
Jeff’s gain may be considerable.  More importantly, if the constitutive 
value account relies on Pete’s actual self-monitoring to underwrite claims to 
privacy, then Pete would have no claim if he failed to learn of Jeff’s 
monitoring.  And Pete would not have a claim if he did not particularly 
mind the privacy loss, nor would he have a claim if he minded, but was 
too preoccupied for the loss to affect his perceptions of his actions.  Yet 
it seems clear that Pete’s claim, if indeed he has a claim, exists independent 
of how Jeff’s actions actually affect him. 
One possibility to consider is that Pete does not have a claim to 
privacy about the various aspects of his life with respect to Jeff.  There 
are a couple of ways to develop this possibility.  First, one might say that 
Pete has some claim or other, but that the claim is not a claim to privacy.  
Thus, Pete might have a claim not to be followed, not to have his 
movements tracked, not to have his coffee cups and hair picked out of 
the trash and examined, and so forth.46  One problem with this view is 
that it is not at all clear that Pete has a claim to each of the atomic parts 
of the larger claim.  Many of Jeff’s actions may themselves be morally 
neutral.  For example, merely noting how Pete moves through the grocery 
store would not seem to give rise to any claim on Pete’s part.  And yet 
when such information gathering is combined with other privacy-impinging 
actions, it would seem to impinge upon a claim.  Moreover, each of the 
discrete claims would need some explanation; the most plausible view is 
that they are based on claims to privacy.  That is, it seems more plausible 
that Pete’s privacy claim explains the individual claims (to not be followed, 
to not have his movements archived, et cetera) than that the individual 
claims explain Pete’s claim that Jeff not monitor him. 
 46. See Thomson, supra note 37, at 284–85. 
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Another possibility is that Jeff’s actions are problematic because Pete 
has not consented to being followed and his data being analyzed.  But 
this would be question-begging, for one needs consent to get around 
doing something that would otherwise be morally problematic.  It is 
generally wrong, for example, to stick a needle in a person’s arm; thus, a 
medical provider needs a patient’s consent to do so.  But absent a reason 
to think that Jeff has done something wrong, consent is beside the point.  
Similarly, one might argue that Pete could simply ask Jeff to refrain 
from gathering information, and that would give rise to a claim.  Perhaps 
it would, but that would depend on the strength of Pete’s claims with 
regard to the underlying action.  That is, Pete would have no claim that 
Jeff refrain from noting to himself what time Pete walks down the street, 
even if Pete requests that he do so.  There may be an independent reason 
that Jeff ought to do as Pete asks—perhaps it is a virtue to be accommodating 
of such requests.  But that is different from saying that Pete has a claim 
that Jeff do so.  In contrast, if Pete has a claim to privacy in the first 
place, his asking Jeff to refrain from gathering information will indeed 
have normative force. 
One might object that I have not differentiated observational and 
informational privacy clearly enough, and that the view that Pete has a 
privacy claim is based in part on Jeff’s observation of Pete rather than 
Jeff’s compiling information about Pete.  Suppose, for example, that Jeff 
kept all of his findings in a computer file, which Kate finds and opens.  
Pete’s loss of informational privacy with respect to Kate is just as great 
as his loss of informational privacy with respect to Jeff, and yet it is not 
at all clear that Pete has a privacy claim with respect to Kate.  While it 
would be correct to say that part of our uneasiness with Jeff’s actions 
comes from his close observation, we can easily imagine a case where 
Jeff does little actual observation, but still gathers a great deal of information 
about Pete.  He might, for example, use cameras, surrogates, or listening 
and tracking devices to gather information.  We cannot say that the surrogates 
observing Pete do something wrong, for each observation of Pete occurs 
in a place where such observations occur all of the time.  Recall that a 
single surrogate watching Pete in the grocery store or on the street is 
morally neutral.  It is hard to see why Jeff causing a morally neutral action 
to happen runs afoul of any claim.  And yet the compilation itself still seems 
problematic. 
The important difference between Kate and Jeff, moreover, seems to 
be the compiling.  This variation points to something else worth noting: 
Jeff’s actions do not merely decrease Pete’s privacy with respect to Jeff.  
Because potential dissemination of information and the likelihood that 
others will be able to make judgments about a person both bear upon 
privacy, Jeff’s information gathering decreases Pete’s privacy with 
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respect to all people—or in any case, many people besides Jeff.  Kate’s 
mere viewing of the assembled information therefore does not constitute 
as substantial a loss of privacy as Jeff’s compilation does.  That is, 
Pete’s privacy about his life (O) with respect to everyone (Q) decreases 
substantially with Jeff’s actions, but Pete’s privacy about his life with 
respect to everyone decreases only modestly with Kate’s discovery. 
The strength of Pete’s claims to privacy will also depend on the type 
of information gathered and domain of inferences underwritten in Jeff’s 
investigations.  Compare the following two situations.  In the first, Jeff 
follows Pete as he completes various errands; he records Pete’s grocery 
store deliberations and purchases, watches his driving habits, and so 
forth.  In the second, Jeff follows Pete as he spends time with his with 
friends and family, for example, by watching their interactions at a 
restaurant, listening in as best he can.  The argument that Pete has a 
claim in the second case seems stronger than the argument that he has a 
claim in the first case.  Thus, the number and particularity of inferences 
underwritten is not the only thing that matters with respect to one’s 
claims to privacy, but the subjects of inferences matter as well.  One has 
less of a claim to privacy about commercial transactions with respect to 
other individuals than one has to privacy about friendly and familial 
relationships with respect to other individuals. 
Supposing that this intuitive case is reasonable, it still demands some 
justification to be persuasive.  The case for privacy claims based on 
constitutive value provides such a justification.  Jeff’s actions fail to 
respect Pete’s reasonable desires for privacy, and the extent of Jeff’s 
surveillance is likely to draw Pete’s attention away from his projects and 
relationships in themselves and see them as open to viewing.  This explains 
why Pete has a stronger privacy claim against incrementally greater 
surveillance by Jeff than he does against a privacy loss of similar magnitude 
carried out by Kate; Pete is more likely to engage in the sort of self-
monitoring that conflicts with the meaning-conferring function of projects 
and relationships with incrementally greater surveillance by a single 
person than he is with smaller, discrete privacy losses about the same 
objects with respect to multiple others.  It also explains Pete’s greater 
claims to privacy in matters regarding projects, relationships, and other 
meaning-conferring goods. 




B.  Privacy with Respect to Organizations 
While there are cases of people picking out individuals and fanatically 
finding out about them, and even publishing information about them, 
those circumstances are rare.  Much more common is the collection of 
data from commercial transactions.  Consider the case of commercial data 
brokerages, which compile, analyze, and trade substantial information 
about people’s purchases, credit history, and public records.  Much of 
this information comes from credit card purchases, use of store discount 
cards, magazine subscriptions, and so forth.47  Such transactions by their 
very nature convey information about P to other Qs; moreover, those 
transactions depend on their being linked to other transactions by P and 
distinguished from all other people’s transactions.  For P to get her, and 
only her, subscriptions and credit card bills, and for P to establish good 
credit so that she can finance a mortgage, sign a lease, or finance an 
automobile requires that there be records that allow others to make 
particularized judgments about P’s financial circumstances, address, and 
other basic information.  Thus, P consents, at least implicitly, to the 
accumulation and sharing of her information with the parties and institutions 
that are necessary in making the transactions possible. 
One might object that inferring P’s consent to Q’s information gathering 
from P’s use of an institution that depends on information gathering is 
problematic.  After all, when P applies for a credit card, mortgages a 
house, or buys things with a credit card, P may very well not realize what 
sorts of information are necessary to support her actions.  Regardless, 
there are good reasons to infer consent.  The first reason is that any credit 
user encounters a surfeit of evidence for such information sharing.  One 
actually has to apply for credit, for example.  More importantly, monthly 
bills contain itemized lists of purchases, and those lists come in the mail 
addressed to the credit user.  Second, it is reasonable to think that credit 
users would consent to the information sharing necessary to support the 
institution of consumer credit, if asked.  In contrast, it seems less reasonable 
to assume that consumers would consent to commercial data brokers sharing 
their information for purposes that are unnecessary for a functioning 
credit institution, for example, sharing the information with direct marketers.  
Finally, the larger issue is about P’s privacy claims.  The fact that P may 
not give explicit, fully informed, and fully aware consent to information 
sharing does leave many of P’s claims intact.  P’s explicit, fully informed, 
and fully aware consent to information sharing would clearly be sufficient 
for her to relinquish privacy claims with respect to that information.  But 
 47. See generally ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 42–52 (2005). 
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it is not reasonable to suppose that it is necessary to relinquish privacy 
claims, for P would be remiss to think that credit use involved no 
information sharing. 
Suppose that a consumer, Pat, uses her credit card, store discount cards, 
and so forth for almost every purchase.  She has the usual presence in public 
records, her address and phone number are in public directories, she 
subscribes to various newspapers and magazines, and so forth.  Suppose, 
too, that she is well aware that those transactions are recorded and tagged 
as hers—and as noted above, the very existence of such transactions 
presupposes that kind of information collection.  Over the course of several 
years, commercial data brokers have an extensive record of Pat’s actions, 
which reveal patterns and proclivities.  They have also used her public records 
to gather demographic information.  Pat’s address, for example, provides a 
number of clues to her socioeconomic status.  In turn, brokers can use 
those records to make some predictions about the sorts of products Pat is 
likely to buy, the sort of advertising that is most likely to appeal to her, 
and so forth.  It is hard to see how Pat would have a claim that data 
brokerages not compile, combine, and analyze such data.  That Pat lacks 
a claim to privacy in this case is in line with the sketch of principles 
provided above.  There is little reason to think that data brokers learning of 
her purchases, subscriptions, and public records would conflict with her 
drawing meaning from important relationships or projects, for example.  
Notice that this contrasts with similar levels of information gathering by 
individuals.  Further, ex hypothesi, Pat is aware of the information that 
others gather, and presumably has no expectations otherwise. 
Things are much less clear with respect to broader information sharing, as 
when a broker sells information to third parties.  One possibility is that 
one has no claim at all to privacy about information revealed in public 
records and commercial databases.  On this view, P has no claim to privacy 
about O with respect to any Q, so long as O is information in, or derived 
from, a commercial database,  public records, or both.  This view seems 
too strong for a couple of reasons.  First, the broader sharing begins to 
conflict with Pat’s expectations of privacy.  While Pat may expect that 
others will compile some of her information, the downstream uses of her 
data will in all likelihood outrun those expectations.48  If she has a 
 48. Note that on the particularized judgment view, P’s privacy decreases as more 
Qs have access to such information, and may thereby make more particularized 
judgments regarding P. 




concern about that compilation, or if she would have a concern were she 
to learn of it, it becomes more plausible that she has a claim to that 
privacy. 
While we can infer consent to some degree of information sharing 
from a person’s taking advantage of institutions that depend on that 
sharing, as a broker puts information to broader and broader uses, the 
claim that a person has consented to its use becomes strained.  Recall 
that the reason some degree of information sharing is permissible is not 
because there is explicit, informed consent to such sharing, but rather 
because one can legitimately infer consent from the fact that the consumer 
takes advantage of an institution that relies on information sharing for its 
existence.  However, where the consumer does not take such advantage, 
that hypothetical consent is dubious.  Suppose, for example, that a 
commercial data broker begins a program that analyzes its data so as to 
pick out people who work for one company or organization, but patronize 
competitors.  The broker then markets the listing to companies as a tool 
to assess particular employees’ loyalty.  Now suppose that Pat uses her 
credit card and store discount card to pay for her weekly groceries at 
FoodStore, despite the fact that she works in marketing for GroceryMart, 
FoodStore’s competitor.  When GroceryMart learns of Pat’s habits, it 
demotes or fires her. 
In the same way that we can infer P’s consent to the information 
sharing necessary for the existence of the institution she participates in, 
we can infer that a consumer would not consent to certain types of 
information sharing, viz., those that are likely to harm the subject in normal 
circumstances.  In the example, the decrease in privacy runs contrary to 
Pat’s projects, which is something she could not have reasonably consented 
to, and the decrease in privacy therefore appears to be a failure of respect 
for her as chooser of such projects.49  One might point out here that Pat’s 
participation in information-sharing practices may in fact have a form of 
consent attached, as when creditors, magazines, warrantors, and so forth 
actually publish information regarding their privacy sharing practices.  
Notice, though, that relying on such policies to argue that Pat has no 
claim presupposes such a claim exists in the first place. 
C.  Privacy with Respect to State Actors 
In the previous two parts, I identified several factors that bear upon the 
question of whether P has a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q.  
One factor in determining P’s privacy claim is whether Q is another 
individual or a commercial organization.  There are a number of reasons 
 49. Thanks to Fred Harrington for this point. 
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why the answer could make a difference.  Organizations have fewer reasons 
to pick out a single individual to watch and analyze closely, and much of 
the information held in commercial databases is there because of implicit 
consent by the subjects or the information is not subject to privacy 
claims in the first place. 
The next question I would like to consider is whether it matters that Q 
is a state entity when determining whether P has a claim to privacy 
about O with respect to Q.  To begin, it seems clear that people have 
some claim to privacy with respect to the state.  Police have limits on the 
degree to which they may follow, monitor, or keep tabs on us, and 
administrative agencies may not collect information about us without 
justification.50  There are, of course, many cases in which state actors are 
justified in collecting information about individuals; but nonetheless, 
some justification is required.  Moreover, it is certainly the case that one’s 
legal claims to privacy depend upon whether it is the state or a private 
entity gathering information.  Search and seizure law, for example, is replete 
with examples of searches that are permissible when performed by 
private parties, but impermissible with even slight government agreement, 
encouragement, or cooperation.51  The question here, though, is whether 
 50. I mean this as primarily a moral claim, which I think is uncontroversial.  
Absent moral limits on the degree to which police and administrative agencies may 
collect and disseminate our information, we would have no grounds for complaint with 
unfettered searches and information collection, and no justification for restricting such 
searches and collection.  There are also legal restrictions on police and administrative 
agency information gathering and dissemination, which are justified, I take it, by the 
moral claim.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2000) (limiting use of wiretaps); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(b) (2000) (“No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system 
of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except 
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to 
whom the record pertains . . . .”); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2000) (requiring that each 
agency maintaining records shall “maintain in its records only such information about an 
individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to 
be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President.”); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(b)(1) (2000) (prohibiting the release of federal funds to educational agencies or 
institutions that release education records without consent). 
 51. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475–76 (1921) (holding search 
by private party did not violate Fourth Amendment even though information obtained in 
search was turned over to government prosecutors); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 
788, 791–93 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an airline employee who had previously given, 
and been paid for giving, evidence to federal agents violated the Fourth Amendment 
when he opened a suspicious package looking for evidence of a crime); see also Walter 
v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1980) (holding that tapes were permissibly 
seized by independent third party, but the FBI’s subsequent screening of the films 
violated the Fourth Amendment); Stapleton v. Superior Court, 447 P.2d 967, 970 (Cal. 




such differences are justified.  I think that they are, based on three important 
differences between state and commercial privacy infringement.  First, 
there is a difference in the amount of information use that individuals 
implicitly consent to in private transactions versus the amount they 
consent to in state information collection.  Second, there is a difference 
in the degree to which state and commercial actors may act arbitrarily.  
Third, the reasons that support privacy’s constitutive value are particularly 
salient with respect to state information gathering. 
First consider the difference in consent.  In Part V.B, I argued that 
much of the information collected and analyzed commercially comes 
from consensual transactions that are part of a practice requiring information 
sharing and analysis for its very existence.  Participating in, and taking 
advantage of, an institution that demands substantial information sharing 
for its very existence—for example, consumer credit—implies that one 
consents to having her transactional information shared.  Moreover, that 
consent takes place amid choice, for one can opt out of transactions that 
require particularized information, at least to a degree. 
This is not true in the case of state-collected information.  The state 
has an enormous power to collect information about income and finances, 
education, property, travel, et cetera.  Having one’s information collected in 
this way is impossible to avoid; indeed, much of it is compelled.52  There 
is a sense in which people have consented to certain types of information 
gathering, in that democratically enacted laws and democratically 
created administrative agencies provide for information collection.53  
However, there is an important difference in democratic consent to certain 
sorts of information collection, and the consent implicit in consumer 
transactions.  Consent to commercial information gathering is general, in 
that participating in, for example, credit card transactions, presupposes 
that the information generated from that transaction will be aggregated 
with all sorts of other information to verify that the person entering the 
transaction is legitimately entitled to the credit, as discussed above.  But 
democratically based consent to state information gathering need not, 
and generally will not, take that form.  So, for example, the information 
the state collects about students in public schools likely does not get 
1968) (holding evidence inadmissible when a private citizen acts as an agent of the 
police and seizes private property as part of a joint operation with the police). 
 52. For an overview of federal and state government information gathering, see 
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 
MINN. L. REV 1137, 1141–48 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1400–03 
(2001). 
 53. See Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 16 (Rolf Sartorius 
ed., 1983); Robert Streiffer & Alan Rubel, Democratic Principles and Mandatory 
Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food, 18 PUB. AFF. Q. 223, 236–38 (2004). 
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aggregated with income tax information, unless a student is applying for 
financial aid; information gathered by the census is not aggregated with 
driver’s license information, and so forth. 
Moreover, unlike consumer credit, which is an institution that demands 
for its existence substantial amalgamation of information about particular 
individuals, much state information does not demand substantial 
amalgamation.  One can, for example, run effective vehicle and driver’s 
licensing programs without people’s educational or income tax records.  
And when there is a need for a nexus of varied public sector information, 
people can provide consent to such consolidation.  For example, we 
might make income tax records available to police during criminal 
investigations, but not otherwise.  Thus, the consent given for state information 
collection will not underwrite the same degree of information amalgamation 
as the consent given to private information collection. 
The second difference between state and commercial data collection 
concerns arbitrary action.  I argued in the previous part that much of the 
data collection and analysis done by commercial data brokers is not 
problematic on the grounds that the subjects of the information implicitly 
consent to the collection and analysis.  But of course people do not 
literally consent to every imaginable use of their data; rather, they consent 
to a reasonable range of data uses.  The precise scope of that consent is 
not clear, but not important here.  The important issue is that within that 
reasonable range, we think that commercial entities have latitude to 
analyze and use that data however they wish.  In other words, individuals 
and commercial entities can for the most part act according to whatever 
reasons they see fit, with comparatively few restrictions.  This is not true 
for state action.  Any state action, and especially state action that bears 
upon something people consider deeply important, such as privacy, needs to 
have some justification, which is to say that state action ought not be 
arbitrary.  This is important in that even within a government organization 
that collects information, the information should not be used for reasons 
that differ from the reasons that justify the collection in the first place.  It 
is even more important across government agencies that keep their own 
data discrete. 
To illustrate, consider ordinary police actions in the United States.  
We generally recognize that police have some discretion to stop people 
and investigate suspicious circumstances.  However, that discretion is 
circumscribed.  Police in the United States may not detain or seize a 
person without a reasonable suspicion based upon articulated facts, and 




even then, their inquiries must be limited.54  They may only pat down a 
subject to assure that the subject is not armed if there is reasonable 
suspicion that the detainee is armed and dangerous, but they may not 
fully search him for contraband without a higher standard of evidence.55  
Until recently, it was unclear whether police could demand that a person 
whom police reasonably suspect of wrongdoing had to identify herself;56 
even now, police cannot demand a person to identify herself without reason 
to suspect that the person is involved in criminal activity.57  Those barriers 
seem correct, regardless of the constitutional precepts they rest upon.  
That is, the degree to which a police officer ought to be able to make 
particularized judgments about a person will depend on the degree to 
which the police officer’s suspicions are warranted.  In other words, police 
may not arbitrarily access personal information in the first place, and the 
mere fact that they may access some information does not underwrite 
their accessing all information available from all state sources. 
So, for example, the fact that Pierre makes multiple furtive exchanges 
with a variety of passersby in an area known for drug trafficking might 
arouse enough suspicion in police officer Quinn to justify Quinn’s 
detaining Pierre and asking him questions, but more would be required 
for Quinn to pat Pierre down for weapons.  He might be warranted in 
asking Pierre for identification, and using Pierre’s identification to search 
for outstanding arrest warrants.58  However, that level of suspicion and 
contact with police by itself ought not allow Quinn to access any sort of 
record that the state keeps on Pierre.  The state is likely to have income 
tax, employment assistance, social service, educational, property, driving, 
birth, family, and marriage records, and certainly Quinn’s having access to 
such records could be useful in some circumstances—for instance, finding 
tax delinquents.  However, actually making those records available to any 
police officer in routine interactions would require a fairly powerful 
justification.  That is, while Pierre may not have a claim to privacy 
about his name, whether there are weapons in his pockets, and his record 
of outstanding arrest warrants with respect to Quinn, he does have 
claims to privacy with respect to Quinn about his school record, his 
visits to a public hospital, his income tax returns, his military record, his 
social security payments, the nonweapon items in his pockets, and so 
 54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28–29. 
 56. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)). 
 57. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 52. 
 58. Even these are controversial.  The point, though, is that there is some level of 
suspicion that would warrant such impingements of privacy, but no more.  That level of 
suspicion is all I am trying to pick out in this example. 
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forth.  To allow Quinn access to that information absent some substantial 
justification would be arbitrary. 
Such limitations are not limited to police access to records.  Rather, 
people have privacy claims about any information collected by a state 
agency with respect to other agencies.  Consider how things would look 
if there were no limitations on the information shared across agencies.  
To take one example, educational institutions would have unfettered access 
to records about income, finances, employment, involvement with the 
court system, driving records, property, and so forth.  Similarly, departments 
of revenue would have unfettered access to educational and medical 
records, court records, and travel records (for example, customs records, 
electronic road toll records, et cetera).  Sometimes, there are very good 
reasons for one agency to have access to information kept by other 
agencies.  Criminal investigators may have good reason to access tax 
records, and the substantial overlap between health and human services 
agencies and education administrations may provide a reason for them to 
share information.  But this underscores the primary point.  People have 
claims to privacy about information held by state agencies with respect 
to other state agencies, and access across agencies demands a justification. 
The third difference between state and commercial actors speaks to 
the underlying explanation of privacy claims.  First, one is more likely to 
see one’s projects or relationships as public goods due to state information 
gathering than as a result of commercial information gathering, both 
because of the reach and role of the state.  And second, failures to respect 
persons seem particularly acute when executed by state actors. 
To reiterate, people have claims to privacy with respect to the state.  In 
many cases they provide consent, via democratic processes, to state 
agencies collecting and analyzing information.  However, that consent 
does not imply that any state agency should be able to access any 
information collected by any other state agency, though people may use 
those same democratic processes to explicitly consent to such sharing.  
Rather, information sharing across agencies requires its own explicit consent 
or some other justification for overriding persons’ privacy claims.  This 
situation is different than the case of commercial data brokerages that 
may use the information they collect with implicit consent for their own 
even arbitrary purposes, so long as those purposes do not violate some 
other claim, for example, a use to which one could not reasonably consent. 




D.  Generalizing Claims to Privacy 
At the start of this part, I articulated several general principles to help 
determine whether P has a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q.  
In Parts V.A to V.C, I outlined a number of cases to help illustrate the 
ways in which P will have different claims to privacy based on different 
Qs.  With those cases in mind, some generalizations about claims to 
privacy based on constitutive value can be made.  First, P is more likely 
to have a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q where P’s privacy 
has decreased substantially with respect to Q.  This falls out of the Pete 
and Jeff example in Part V.A.  Where Jeff zealously collects information 
about Pete, Jeff impinges a claim.  Moreover, it may be the case that 
many particular instances of Jeff’s information collection would impinge 
no claim and diminish nothing of value (for instance, noting Pete’s habit 
of arriving to work at a particular time) in isolation, but those same 
actions do seem to impinge a claim against the background of Jeff’s 
pervasive information gathering.  That is, there seems to be some kind of 
threshold at work.  This holds true across different sorts of Qs.  Consider 
police actions.  For the most part, P has no claim to privacy over his 
actions in a public place with respect to police officers who happen to be 
nearby.  However, if the police pay particular attention to P—following, 
watching, filming, and so forth—the attention impinges a claim.59  Note 
that this criticism differs from P’s claim against arbitrary state action.  
Where the police have legitimate reason to follow P, but that reason only 
warrants a modicum of information gathering, substantial information 
gathering impinges a privacy claim.  But the existence of legitimate 
reasons means that the information gathering is not arbitrary. 
It does not follow, however, that P has a claim to privacy beyond a 
certain threshold.  In fact, there is no limit on the degree to which P’s 
privacy can decrease, so long as those decreases are accompanied by 
adequate consent.  Consider the commercial data broker cases.  If P 
gives implicit consent for Q, a data broker, to collect and analyze his data, 
and gives further, explicit consent to having that information shared, and 
other information collected, then P will have no claims to privacy even 
where the amount of information, and the degree of particularity of judgment 
underwritten, becomes enormous. 
This leads to the next generalization.  Consent to privacy decreases 
can be inferred from the nature of the process by which information is 
gathered.  Taking advantage of institutions that depend for their existence 
on information collection and analysis implies that one consents to the 
 59. To be clear, impinging a claim does not mean that it is, all things considered, 
improper.  Rather, it just means that the action demands an adequate justification. 
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degree of information collection and analysis necessary for that institution 
to exist.  One cannot infer consent to uses for which one would never 
reasonably give consent—as when a broker amasses information that can 
be used for discriminatory purposes.  That would be a failure of respect for 
the person to whom the information pertains.60 
We can also make some generalizations concerning the sorts of 
information that are more likely to be the subject of a privacy claim, as 
described in Part III and at the beginning of this part.  P is more likely to 
have a claim to privacy about O with respect to Q where O is a 
particularly meaning-conferring good and diminishing privacy detracts 
from O’s ability to confer meaning.  Similarly, P will have a claim to 
privacy about O with respect to Q where O plays an important role in 
P’s shaping her personality and actions, and where P’s loss of privacy 
about O with respect to Q would lead P to alter O.  And P will have a 
claim to privacy about O with respect to Q where O is an object that plays a 
central feature in shaping P’s life, and in which P has a reasonable 
concern for and a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to Q. 
Finally, we may make some generalizations about the nature of the 
information gatherer.  I suggested that the likelihood of privacy loss with 
respect to state actors and individuals is more likely to implicate the 
constitutive values on which the distributed value account relies; we are 
more likely to have claims to privacy with respect to those actors.  Further, 
because state actors ought to act with justification (unlike nonstate actors), 
 60. There are important remaining issues here.  The institution of consumer credit 
requires a certain amount of information collection and sharing to function; however, it 
requires much more information sharing to function effectively, still more to function 
effectively and cheaply, and yet still more to function effectively, cheaply, and exceedingly 
profitably.  The degree to which consumers consent to information sharing by using 
some form of consumer credit is unclear.  Note that if selling information makes credit or 
consumer goods cheaper to the benefit of consumers, it does not follow that people 
consent to those sales.  After all, it might make clothing cheaper if stores sold videotapes 
of people trying the clothing on, but it does not follow that anyone purchasing the 
clothing for the lower price consents to such a sale. 
Michael Froomkin argues that because aggregation of data adds value for the data 
broker, the marginal value of any bit of information is less than the average aggregate 
value of all information available to data brokers, and consumers will therefore not 
bargain to maintain privacy.  Perhaps more persuasively, he argues that consumers are 
generally unaware of the extent to which their information is aggregated and analyzed, 
and therefore do not avoid information-revealing transactions or bargain for privacy 
protections.  A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 
1502–05 (2000). 




we will have greater claims against information amalgamation with respect 
to state actors. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
My task in this paper has been to provide an account of privacy’s 
value, and how such value might give rise to claims to privacy.  I argued 
that privacy’s value is not unary, but distributed, such that whether 
privacy has value will depend upon particular aspects of the three-part 
relation involved.  At its strongest, privacy is valuable as a constitutive 
part of states of affairs that are valuable in themselves.  Often, however, 
privacy is morally neutral, or weakly instrumentally valuable.  Because 
of this, determining where persons have claims to privacy is problematic.  
While I cannot offer an algorithm for assessing claims to privacy, I 
outlined a number of plausible generalizations. 
If I am correct about the distributed nature of privacy’s value, and if 
some of the generalizations I  have made are accurate, there remains a 
great deal to be said about what those generalizations mean for how 
information ought to be managed.  Two current issues illustrate this point.  
The first concerns surreptitious information gathering.  If we have claims to 
privacy regarding certain information with respect to, for example, the 
state, does that give rise to claims that we know, or have the opportunity 
to know, of that loss?  I think it does, largely because we have claims to 
information important in ordering our lives.61  Second, the boundaries I 
have drawn around generalizations are exceedingly vague.  State actors 
often rely upon nonstate data brokerages to compile information, such 
that the Q in a privacy relation is far from clear.62  Similarly, whether 
information implicates meaning-conferring goods, one’s ability to act as 
an autonomous chooser of one’s life, or one’s ability to have a 
personality of one’s making will vary widely.  Nonetheless, I think 
that being clear about privacy’s tripartite structure, viewing privacy’s 
value as distributed rather than unary, and thinking of claims to privacy 
as being a function of particular features of privacy relationships is the 
right mechanism by which to analyze the more complex problems out 
there. 
 
 61. See Rubel, supra note 31, at 151–54. 
 62. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and 
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 
29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 636 (2004); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
PERSONAL INFORMATION: AGENCY AND RESELLER ADHERENCE TO KEY PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
4–7 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06421.pdf. 
